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The Relevance of the AutoPact for Other Sectoral
Arrangements
by Simon S. Reisman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Conference program has allocated the entire afternoon to the releThe
vance of the AutoPact for integration of other Canada-U.S. industrial
sectors. It would seem that the Conference planners anticipated that an
examination of the Automotive Agreement would enlighten us in selecting other sectors and in designing terms and conditions that would encourage agreement between our two governments to extend the scope of
sectoral free-trade.
If this was indeed the expectation, I must confess immediately that
if I adhered strictly to the allocated subject I would leave you a good deal
of free time this afternoon. Accordingly, I will first talk about the Automotive Agreement, but then extend my remarks beyond that topic and
venture into the realm of a comprehensive free-trade agreement between
our two countries. And, I would like to go a little beyond that. But let's
see whether we can find inspiration in the AutoPact-its origin, terms
and history-to help us with the issue of regional free-trade in other sectors. Can this pattern be extended to other industries?
II. THE AUTOPACT
A.

Conditions Before the Automotive Agreement

A word first about the structure of the Canadian car industry at the
time that we entered into the AutoPact. Virtually the entire production
of cars and trucks in Canada was then, and is now, accounted for by
wholly-owned and controlled subsidiaries of the Big Four American motor vehicle corporations. The pattern was somewhat different in the production of original equipment parts. Less than half the total output in
Canada was in the hands of the Big Four, one-quarter was accounted for
by ten independent multinational companies, and about 400 smaller
companies, most of which were Canadian owned, produced the balance
of the original equipment parts. Labor in the industry was then repre* Chairman of the Board, Reisman & Grandy, Ltd. (Ottawa). Mr. Reisman was the chief
negotiator for Canada of the 1965 Canada-UnitedStates Automotive Agreement (AutoPact). He is a
director of several Canadian companies and is a financial advisor to both business and government.
He has served the Canadian government as Deputy Minister of Industry, Secretary of the Treasury
Board, and Deputy Minister of Finance.
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sented by a common international union. Geographically, the industry
was concentrated in a relatively compact region abutting both sides of
the border.
In terms of what, where and when to produce; where and from
whom to source components and materials; industrial relations; pricing
policy; government relations; and other key decision areas, the automotive industry on both sides of the border was dominated by a handful of
giant enterprises, which made all these key decisions. Taken together
these characteristics facilitated the negotiation of a bilateral sectoral
trade agreement. But in terms of finding similar conditions in other industries, it would have to be acknowledged that the automotive sector is
rather unique.
What about the origin of the AutoPact and its motivation? Neither
the United States nor Canada set out to negotiate a free-trade arrangement in automotive products. It came to pass not by inspiration, not by
deliberate policy planning, but as a response to necessity.
During the 1950's and early 1960's, the Canadian auto industry
found itself plagued by intense international competition and a reduced
capability for meeting that competition because of rapid technological
change. To keep up with the new technology required capital investment
in all segments of the industry, on a scale well beyond the capacity or
economic justification of truncated, relatively small-scale enterpriseswhether foreign owned or Canadian. The very survival of the industry
required a massive restructuring, and this could not be accomplished
either within the existing policy framework or within the limitations of
the small Canadian market.
Canada tried to escape this dilemma by introducing a not atypical
Canadian commercial policy invention: combining elements of free-trade
with continued protection. Now that is quite a trick. The first experimenting was a duty-remission scheme, for imported transmissions and
engines, equivalent to any increase achieved in exporting Canadian made
components. Success in this encouraged Canada to broaden the policy
whereby duty would be remitted on any vehicle or component import if
matched by equivalent exports of vehicles or parts. The effect of this
operation was to reduce the import duty which was paid on both components and parts. In essence the project was designed to encourage specialization, larger production runs, and reduced costs, through
expanding exports to offset the larger imports such a system would
entail.
The United States was reasonably tolerant of the 1961-62 experiment, but became less so when Canada broadened the scheme to take
further advantage of the specialization efforts involved. In response to
complaints by its auto parts producers, the U.S. launched a countervailing duty investigation to determine whether the Canadian measure
was equivalent to a subsidy. Canada argued that its measures reduced
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rather than raised duties, expanded rather than contracted trade, and
were really not a subsidy.
The U.S. investigation was never completed because both countries
were sufficiently concerned about the impact that an adverse ruling
would have on trade and other relationships to force them to seek a more
constructive solution. Intensive negotiations over several months led to
the AutoPact. It is not clear who was the real driver in finding the qualified free-trade solution. I have always been prepared to give Phil Trezise
all the credit and he has always insisted that I must share the blame.
I am not sure what moral to draw from this episode. Do we have to
get into a crisis situation affecting an industry before we are inspired to
find reasonable solutions based on freer trade? None of the recent or
current inquiries into alleged trade misdemeanors-steel, lumber, manufactured foods containing sugar, fish, potatoes, pork-would seem to
lend themselves to resolution in the form of sectoral free-trade
arrangements.
B.

Terms and Conditions of the Agreement

What of the substance of the AutoPact-its terms and conditions?
Can we find a model there which would serve in crafting an agreement
suitable for other industrial sectors?
In broad terms, the AutoPact provided for free-trade between the
two countries in vehicles and original equipment parts. Replacement
parts, tires, batteries and used cars were excluded. A number of safeguards were written into the agreement, and there were certain commitments made by the motor vehicle manufacturers relating to their
production plans. Together, these satisfied Canada that the transition to
free-trade would be orderly and would take place in a framework of expanding production. The U.S. holds that the safeguards were meant to
disappear after a transitional period-albeit of undefined duration. For
its part, Canada has argued that safeguards are needed to ensure that its
industry can participate on a fair and equitable basis in an expanding
North American market. Things are quiescent now, but the peace remains uneasy.
The Agreement was unlimited in duration but subject to termination
on one year's notice by either party. It has now been in force for twenty
years with only minor changes. Over its life there have been complaints
on both sides-depending on how the balance of trade was working out.
For many years the U.S. had a surplus. In the past two years the surplus
has been in Canada's favor-to a massive degree: Canadian exports of
automobiles and automotive parts to the United States exceeds total Canadian exports for all products to all other countries in the world. It is a
figure of about $28 billion for 1984, compared to $24 billion for all other
exports to the rest of the world.
At the time we negotiated, the U.S. team urged that we put a three
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year limit on the transitional period. The Canadian side resisted on the
grounds they could not tell in advance what a three year period would
do. What we were worried about was that there seemed to be institutional barriers and attitudes, particularly on the part of the United States
management of large concerns operating on both sides of the border,
about depending on Canada as a source of supply for finished cars.
I recall a discussion with the chief executive officer of the largest of
these corporations. He said: "We are the car manufacturers of the world.
We would not dare put cars in a showroom with a Canadian made label." Two years later, this same man said to me: "People come into our
showrooms and they want to know if a car was assembled in Canada,
because that is the car they want." I have felt for some time that those
safeguards have outlived their usefulness. They are a nuisance and limit
the gains we can make from the free-trade arrangement. I would hope
that in future arrangements we do not try to replicate the notion that
safeguards need to last beyond some relatively short and firm period.
C. Results from the AutoPact
A fair reading of the results of the AutoPact is that both sides have
benefited. Canada has benefited relatively more than the U.S., but this is
inevitable in any situation where the U.S. begins with a massive home
market and Canada begins with a small protected market. The AutoPact
rescued Canada from the inefficient high-cost assembly and parts production associated with a small market, short runs, small scale, and highly
differentiated models and parts. By encouraging the production of a
more limited range of cars and original equipment parts for the whole
North American market, Canada developed the capability of competing
fully with assembly and parts plants in the U.S. And in some instances it
led the way in cost cutting and overall efficiency.
For its part the U.S. has also benefited. The Canadian market is a
richer and bigger market for automotive products and the U.S. has
shared in its growth. The major companies are U.S. owned and they
enjoy a better return on capital which is manifest in the form of better
profits. A trade-war was averted that would have been costly for both
counties-critically so to Canada.
Can we conclude from this that the U.S. would be willing to accept
trade agreements, in particular sectoral agreements, which would include
safeguards for Canada of unlimited duration? I believe, in this respect,
the AutoPact is sui generis-andwill not be repeated. Canada may need
transitional periods to adjust to a free-trade regime, either sectoral or
comprehensive, but there is little justification for indefinite transitional
safeguards.
A more technical matter relates to the international acceptability of
sectoral free-trade arrangements. The United States sought and obtained
a GATT waiver for its measures under the AutoPact. Canada did not
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need a waiver because it extended the right of free entry to automotive
products from any source, providing the importer qualified as a bona-fide
automobile manufacturer and met certain conditions. I doubt that the
U.S. would wish to seek such a waiver again; or if it did, that the GATT
countries would acquiesce, considering the AutoPact has not, even now,
matured into a full free-trade arrangement.
D. Conclusions Relevant to Free-TradeArrangements
What can we conclude about the relevance of the AutoPact for
other sectoral arrangements? I would say it is relevant-but not very.
Future sectoral free-trade deals, if any, will have to be quite different in a
number of important respects. Furthermore, I must confess skepticism
about sectoral deals. They do not really solve Canadian problems. They
yield only limited benefits; they are difficult to negotiate; they bring out
protectionist sentiments; and, they would be resisted by the GATT countries. I think they would divert us from arrangements that are much
more important and more significant-whether on a multilateral or on a
comprehensive basis.
However, there are some important lessons to be learned from the
AutoPact experience, should our two countries decide to work out a
more comprehensive free-trade agreement:
1. The AutoPact has produced large, tangible benefits for both countries. These take the form of lower prices for consumers, higher wages
for labor, and more profits for investors-all made possible by higher
productivity. Over the past twenty years, I estimate that in 1985 dollars
these benefits have exceeded $30 billion for Canada. The benefits of a
comprehensive free-trade arrangement would have been a large multiple
of that figure. Based on research done by professionals in business and
professors at institutes, a matured comprehensive free-trade agreement
could add $40 billion per annum (in current dollars) in additional output,
about 10% in terms of GNP and earned dollars. And those benefits
could be available each year for as long as the comprehensive free-trade
agreement remained in effect.
2. The partner with the smaller markets and the higher protection
stands to gain relatively more because it has more distance to go in
greater efficiency and higher productivity associated with scale and
specialization.
3. By the same token, the weaker partner at the beginning of the
process has a higher price to pay during the period of adjustment. There
are also more risks for the weaker partner from possible interruption in
the arrangement or, at the extreme, abrogation. The large investments
required to gear up to a continental market would depend upon a reasonably favorable and stable commercial policy environment.
4. It would therefore be reasonable for the weaker partner to be
granted a transitional period during which to restructure. It would be no
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less reasonable for the stronger partner to ask that the transitional period
be of firm duration and that it be unwound in accordance with a firm
timetable of progress towards symmetry.
5. Finally, lack of clarity in the terms of the AutoPact led to a great
deal of controversy and acrimony which threatened to overturn the
agreement and at times even threatened to sour the overall relationship.
It would be vital therefore, in any comprehensive agreement, to avoid
ambiguities, however convenient they may appear to be during the
negotiations.
In Toronto recently, I spoke at a conference on trade issues sponsored by the Ontario Economic Council. I examined the various trade
policy options open to Canada against the background of our commercial
policy history. I will not repeat that speech here but from what I have
already said it would not surprise you to know that I rejected the sectoral
free-trade approach. I did so because I believe it is inadequate for our
needs, impractical of implementation, and no longer a serious option in
the view of both our governments. I think the only real option for Canada today is to try to make a bilateral free-trade arrangement with the
United States to cover virtually all goods and services-a comprehensive
free-trade agreement that would meet the full strictures of the GATT.
Such an option has, of course, high risks for Canada. But I believe
these risks are well worth taking if we could negotiate an agreement with
the U.S. that recognized these risks and made reasonable provision to
reduce them to manageable proportions. It would require that the U.S.
be willing to accept an arrangement that was asymmetrical, regarding
rights and obligations, for a transitional period. It would further require
that the U.S. provide the highest possible level of assurance against the
risks of abrogation or impairment of benefits- particularly during the all
important transitional period, when Canadian industry would be engaged in massive investments to facilitate the restructuring process
required.
The concluding part of my Toronto speech went as follows:
Would the United States be willing to go the extra mile in recognizing the Canadian sensitivities and would they be willing to accept
arrangements which were in some respects asymmetrical as to timing,
exceptions, governmental assistance and other particular features that
assist the Canadian restructuring process?
We will never know, of course, unless we try and see what we can
achieve through negotiations. A major difficulty, I fear, is that in economic terms the benefits from free-trade will be asymmetrical. United
States industries already have their mass market and the potential
gains from new investment and improved productivity are certain to be
less impressive than in Canada. In the practical world in which we
live, Americans would, I suspect, have to see concrete benefits in other
areas if they are to accept the terms and conditions that Canadians
would justifiably request in a negotiation.
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III.

TRADING WATER WITH THE UNITED STATES

It is this thought-the need to find some major attractions for the
U.S. side in other areas, which has led me to a rather bold and controversial proposal. Given the extreme sensitivity of the subject I am about to
raise, some of you may think that I have taken complete leave of my
senses. (Remember, this was addressed to a Canadian audience-I
would never admit to Americans that I may have taken leave of my
senses.) But I am willing to take that risk. Perhaps it will help move the
debate forward. Certainly it will heat it up.
The subject is water. For some years now, a group of Canadian
engineers, under the leadership of Thomas Kierans of Newfoundland,
who had a leadership position in the James Bay Project, have been developing the concept of harnessing the flow of fresh water into James Bay.
The idea is to provide a new, large, reliable and renewable source of fresh
water to meet the requirements of both Canada and the United States
into the indefinite future.
This is fresh water that becomes salt water as it flows through James
Bay into Hudson Bay and from there into the Arctic and Atlantic
oceans. It is totally wasted for fresh water use. Exploratory engineering
studies on this subject have been presented and discussed at conferences
in both the U.S. and Canada in recent years, and a great deal of interest
has been shown. This concept, know as the Grand Canal Project, entails
the conversion of James Bay from a salt water body to a fresh water lake
by means of a sea level dike across the mouth of the Bay. In California,
they have done some very extensive work of a similar kind, so the technologically is available. This can be done-if there are good reasons for
doing it.
Some of this fresh water, pouring into James Bay from some twenty
rivers, would be fed into the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence water basin
through the Grand Canal system. This system would consist of a series
of canals, dams, pumping stations and underground water tunnels; it
would also make use of the northern rivers as well as the Ottawa and
French River systems.
The Grand Canal Company is actively promoting the project and, in
cooperation with several reputable engineering companies (three of them
Canadian, one of them American), is at present embarking upon feasibility studies covering the whole range of engineering, environmental and
economic issues involved. I am personally associated with the ongoing
work of the Grand Canal Company, as an advisor on the economic and
financial aspects.
Let me give you some idea of the dimensions of this project. It
would move into Lake Huron a volume of fresh water equivalent to twice
the flow of the Great Lakes system. Once in the Great Lakes, it would be
available to stabilize water levels in that system. The bulk of the water
would be available for transfer through a North American water grid to
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Western Canada and to the mid-West and other parts of the United
States where fresh water is badly needed and becoming increasingly
scarce.
No technological problems are anticipated with the engineering aspects of this project-given other-proven experience, such as the California State Water Project. The main issue is environmental. And the
people who have worked on this believe they can establish with hard
facts that the project will not negatively effect the environment.
The magnitude of the Grand Canal Project is five times the size of
the Apollo Moon project and would cost roughly $100 billion current
dollars. It would take ten years to construct and put into operation,
although it could be put into operation in phases.
The urgent need for fresh water in the United States would make
that country an eager and receptive partner. Canadians would be in a
very strong bargaining position for obvious reasons: it is Canada's water.
If studies confirm, as I believe they will, that this project makes good
sense for Canada in terms of our overall concerns and interests-in particular the environmental concerns-I am satisfied that Canada would
reap enormous economic benefits. And though it may not be widely
known, very important sectors of the United States economy are increasingly concerned about the supply of fresh water. In the next five to fifteen years this may reach severe crisis proportions.
The benefits to Canada will be several. First, the construction of the
project itself would produce 150,000 direct and another 150,000 indirect
jobs, to supply the goods and services needed to support this mammoth
undertaking. A good deal of this demand would inevitably spill over into
the United States. It does not take too much imagination to visualize the
array of machinery, equipment, vehicles, steel, cement, lumber, pumps,
turbines, energy, and the whole range of engineering, financial and other
services that would be required for a project of this kind.
Second, there are the ongoing benefits for Canada once the project
has been built. There would be availability of ample fresh water for Canadian arid regions. It would contribute effective flood control not only
in the Great Lakes region, but over the whole geographical area served
by the new water grid. There would be immense new opportunities for
the native people that now inhabit the region to participate in the construction of this project as well as in the continued operations that
follow.
A third benefit would be the substantial economic rents to be earned
by the owners of the resource (it is expected the price to be obtained for
the new water would more than pay for the capital outlay and operating
costs). What this entails is that water be treated as a "good," as a resource. For too long we have treated it as a free good. One of the difficulties that has led to, of course, is wastage and inadequate emphasis on
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conservation. The advantage here is, as long as God rains on us, the
"good" would be renewable-and that is likely to be for a long time.
Finally, and most importantly, there would be the bargaining leverage which Canada could exercise by virtue of owning this water and being in a position to control its use. I believe this project could provide
the key to a free-trade agreement with the United States which would
combine terms and conditions to meet many of the Canadian concerns
about transition and stability.
I believe we could negotiate a partnership with the United States
based on this project to include the following terms and conditions:
(1) Virtually all the capital required would come from the United
States;
(2) a good price for the water at its full commodity value;
(3) a commitment by the United States to clean up the acid rain
problem-we're talking about fresh water, let us keep it fresh;
(4) a firm undertaking by the United States whereby virtually all
Canadian goods and services would have immediate free access
to the U.S. market-unencumbered by tariffs, non-tariff barriers, emergency import restrictions or any other impediment.
That is, treatment for Canadian goods and services on exactly
the same basis as domestic U.S. goods and services.
(5) Canada would have a ten year transitional period during which
to organize its industries to compete in the continental market,
after which the agreement would become fully reciprocal. And
we would move toward reciprocity during that ten year period
as quickly as the circumstances allowed.
I can say all these brave things because I do not have responsibilities
in these areas today-somebody else will have to do it. I am in the happy
position of a consultant. We advise, put forth these bold ideas-somebody else worries about picking up the pieces. It will be for governments
and officials and those people who have responsibilities to make judgments about whether there is any sense in this.
In terms of benefits for Canada, the water project is viable on its
own merits, just as the free-trade idea is viable on its own. These are
separate, distinct and viable propositions. Properly handled they can be
made to reinforce each other. This mega-project, with all the attendant
benefits apart from the trade possibilities, would make a significant contribution to overcoming our current economic problems for many years
to come. If we had the imagination to link it to our trade objectives it
could put us on a course of economic growth and development that
would assure us of full employment and rising standards of living for the
indefinite future.
Now, I recognize that water has figured prominently in Canada's
relationship with the United States throughout our history. There is perhaps no other subject in our national affairs that arouses as much emo-
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tion, controversy, dogma and prejudice. There is perhaps no other
resource that holds as much promise for our economic future or as much
danger if we do not use it in a timely and just manner. Do we have the
flexibility of mind to approach this subject with open minds, free from
preconceived ideas and the prejudices of the past? Do we have the courage and the imagination and the audacity to take on these two big
projects, free-trade and fresh water, at the same time?
I have personally tried out these ideas on leaders in government and
business on both sides of the border. I have been greatly heartened by
the initial response. The initiative would have to come from CanadaAmericans are fully aware how sensitive these issues are in the Canadian
scheme of things.
I feel confident that if we were able to work out an agreement for
free-trade and water sharing it would be a good thing for both countries,
and it would set a good example for the world. It would make us richer.
It would make us better neighbors because it would remove many of the
frictions about which we have been quarreling for years. It would not
weaken Canadian sovereignty or weaken our ability and our resolve to
exercise our independence. Indeed it would, by enriching us, raise our
confidence and strengthen our will and ability to grow and to contribute
to the world as a strong and free nation.
Thank you.

